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Agricultural marketing, like the field of economics, generally can be
subdivided into three major areas. These include description, analysis, and
policy.
The logic of this breakdown is along the pattern of problem solution
itself. The area of concern must first be described and then analyzed in
terms of the relationships hypothesized from the descriptive material. On
the basis of this analysis, beliefs are formulated concerning the present
state of affairs. Policy enters once these factual and analytical. observa-
tions are made by introducing valuations of “what ought to be” in opposition
to “what is.”
Descriptive Marketing
The marketing system for agricultural products was born from an institu-
tional reconstitution of some processes or functions involved in the produc-
tion and marketing of farm products. The complete set of processes covering
this vertical array of productive activity was performed years ago by a single
group of firms, pioneer farms. The phenomenon of vertical disintegrations
accompanied and prompted by horizontal integration and specialization~pro-
vided for the creation of the supply and marketing sectors contingent to
farming today.
Although this set of processes and the firms performing them are finite
in their composition, the number of functions and institutions involved in
producing and marketing farm commodities is very large indeed. The peculiar
relationships between these processes and firms is further complicated by.2-
the geographical dispersion of markets and resources, various price and power
relationships generated by different market structures, the participation of
government in the marketplace as a buyer as well as a regulator, and all
governed by the increasingly unpredictable nature of consumer demand.
It is not surprising that in the face of such a conglomeration of activity
various simplifying techniques have been offered and employed by research
analysts. Because the first step in research problem-solving is description,
a method of data classification arose. The taxonomic criteria used included
(1) the commodity, (2) the functions (processes),and (3) the institutions
(firms).
Characteristically,this research process of “scientific desc:ciptiont’
first involved the delineation of commodities by their physical character-
istics at the farm level so as to describe “industries” that possessed a —. —
vertical dimension reaching from the farm to the consumer. The marketing
specialist, of course, normally concerned himself only with those processes
involving the commodity after it has left the farmer’s gate. Other delinea-
tions of the research effort included geographical bounds (state, regional
studies), the funds and personnel available, and the interest of the
researcher. Within these bounds, descriptive marketing research has con-
centrated primarily upon identifying which processes were performed loywhat
firms.
This knowledge of the technical supply interrelationships in the
marketing system, coupled with specifications of the number, size, and
organization of the enterprises involved, provided important knowledge of
the industrial structure of the agricultural marketing sector of the
economy.-3-
Such research, however, has served only as a first step in problem
solution. How the system operates is antecedent to wJy it operates as it
does. The latter is the essence of ‘marketing analysis”.
Marketinq Analysis
While “scientific description” has remained important in agricultural
marketing, some economists have objected strenuously to such research methods.
The essence of their objection was that the “functions” studied were class-
ified at the whimsy of the researcher, varying from as few as three functional
groups to as many as two hundred types of productive processes. Nothing, they
arguedj could be more confusing and less scientific. In place of this, such
economists advocated the use of economic theory in research.
Economic theory attempts to specify and explain certain relationships
between economic variables. To do this it emulates the logic of the experi-
mental method, holding all variable constant save one or two. The variables
held constant and the motivating forces at work serve as a prologue of
assumptions to a theoretical analysis of economic phenomena. A rigorous
network of such theory has evolved over time and provides an important base
for the study of many phases of the economy.
The application of this system of theory to marketing research has
been limited. The reasons for this have been three-fold. First, the theory
is itself complex$ requiring intense study for its mastery. Many researchers
have failed to comprehend it to the degree necessary for research application.
Second, the application of such theory to empirical problems frequently re-
quires the use of statistical and mathematical procedures that are unfamiliar
to many marketing specialists. Third, despite its comprehensiveness,the-4-
theory has been able to develop in more complete and determinant form only in
theoretical cases that fail to match “real world” economic activity except in
very extreme form.
Economic theory, however, has been used in agricultural marketing both
to describe and to analyze marketing activity. For descriptive purposes, the
perfectly competitive model of economic theory has been used as a framework
for empirical data, describing how the marketing system would operate jJ
perfectly competitive conditions prevailed throughout the marketing system.
The analysis accompanying this method of description is an attempt to explain
why real marketing activity differs from this theoretical norm.
More recently statisticians and econometricians have been partially
successful in testing various aspects of economic theory through empirical
research involving the use of sophisticatedmathematical tools. Such
researchers are currently specifying supply and demand relationships at
various levels of the marketing system and also are considering locational
aspects of the marketing of farm products by employment of combined trans-
portation and input-output analysis.
Also, of more recent vintage, is the study of the marketing system by
investigating those elements peculiar to the “structure” of the market or
groups of markets and evaluating the conduct of the various market structures
that prevail.
These methods of analysis are conditioned by the way the marketing
sector is described. Similarly, the analysis used to explain WA the mar-
keting system performs as it does has tended to mold valuations of how
the marketing of agricultural products should take place.-5-
Marketinq Policy
The activities of those firms defined by the functional spectrum in-
volving the processing and distribution of farm products are manifested in
their behavior in the market.
These firms operate in two markets as demanders of inputs and suppliers
of output. In each of these markets the firm deals with other firms in two
dimensions: (1) vertically, by dealing with other firms “across-the-market”
and (2) horizontally, by considering the actions or reactions of “like-firms”
in terms of outputs sold or inputs procured. These vertical and horizontal
relationships between firms, called the exchange (negotiative)and com-
petitive relationships respectively, largely explain why firms or groups
of firms behave as they do.
To exert control over these relationships by government through the
regulation of market practices, commodities sold and their prices, the
number and size of firms at various marketing levels and the direct or
indirect regulation of other market conditions is the essence of marketing
policy.
Broadly, government attempts to influence business activity in three
ways. First, federal and state legislation directly aids growing and
declining industries by guaranteeing price supports, restricting competitive
imports, providing new technology through governmental research and dis-





of governmental policy, when applied to the agricultural
economy, comprehends much of what is considered as-6-
“agricultural policy”. This group of economic policies overlap into agri-
cultural marketing in the sense that the government, by supporting farm prices?
becomes a large marketing firm itself. This vast complex of legislation, in
addition to policy actions that can be taken by government as a horizontal
competitor of marketing firms and vertic%Ilyas a purchases of the products
of marketing enterprises, is not discussed in this paper. Any comprehensive
study of agricultural marketing policy would logically include government
in this two-directional role in the marketing system.
Second, government influences business activity by regulating or
prohibitingmonopoliesand the use of monoply power or by sanctioning the
evolution of countervailing.,monopolies and monopoly power.
Third, legislation is aimed at “maintaining competition” by regulating
the nature of the product and degree of entry, by reducing uncertainty and
lack of knowledge, reducing locational disadvantages, and by specifying
trading “rules” that foster competitive market practices.
This paper discusses public policy of these latter two types as it
relates to the market of farm products. Those policies of monopoly control
and creation and the “maintenance” of competition involve conflicting value
judgments that create inconsistencies in agricultural marketing policy.
Part 11. THE GOALS OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETING POLICY
Fundamental to policy formulation and execution are the goals toward
which such programs are directed. All purposeful actions, both economic
and noneconomic, are characterized by the explicit or implicit expression
of certain objectives or goals. These goals derive from beliefs and
valuations.-7-
Beliefs
Beliefs are a combination of the observations we make of existing
phenomena and our understanding of w& this phenomena exists and behaves as
it does. The descriptive method in agricultural marketing provides one way
of classifying observable phenomena. Agricultural marketing analysis
attempts to explain why such phenomena prevail. Our beliefs concerning
agricultural marketing, then, are conditioned both by how marketing activity
is described and how it is analyzed.
The manner in which economic activity is described is molded by the
method of analysis used. The analytical method and the scope of the analysis,
in turn, is related to the descriptivetaxonomy. Where both the descriptive
system and analytical techniques are agreed upon by those interested, funda-
mental agreement can also be reached regarding the “beliefs” held.
But where disagreement concerning methodology exists, as it does in
agricultural marketing? fundamental beliefs about the marketing system show
variation. To illustrate, the market phenomenon of “vertical integration”
caused a host of beliefs to be formed, not only in terms of describing
what vertical integration is, but more so as to why it prevailed. The
continued development, use, and acceptance, of economic theory in the
analysis of such phenomena will tend to dispell such disagreements.
Opposing beliefs in agricultural marketing are not solely the result
of conflicting methodology. Many forces prevail simultaneously in any
market situation, and in varying degrees of intensity. All of these
forces must be considered in an adequate explanation of market conduct.
To evaluate the simultaneous effect of a large number of variables is
beyond human capacities. In any decision-making process it is necessary-8-
to “hold other things constant” while analyzing the changes in one or two
variables.
It is apparent that what is held constant and at what level it is held .—
constant will influence the nature of the changesin the variables considered.
For example, if the number of firms in an industry is very la-rge and is
considered constant through the analysis, the output decisons by any firm
in the industry will differ considerably from the situation where only few
firms prevailed in the industry.
Those elements (number of firms here) that, when changed, significantly
influence market decisons are summarized as the “market structure” that
prevails. Each element, by influencing market decisions, influences how
firms behave negotiatively and competitivelywith other firms -their
“market conduct.”
Both market structure and market conduct are observable phenomena.
In this context, markets can be described, defined, or delineated by
consideration of certain structural elements. The relationships between
market structure and market conduct, and vice versa, are prescribed
theoretically in economic analysis. Again, description and analysis are
basic to the “beliefs” held.
Valuations
Valuations are expressions of certain fundamental “norms” or standards
of behavior. These behavioral norms are formulated fundamentally by ethical
teachings that are related to the behavior of man. Man must deal with his
environment, other men, and himself. These teaching provide behavioral
standards for man in each of these aspects of his life.-9-
These behavioral standards extend to economic activity through man as
a policy-maker. @man ouqht to behave with respect to other men is .—
re-cast in terms of how firms ought to behave in regard to other firms.
Behavioral relationships between firms are manifested in the market through
their negotiative and competitive relationships,
Output decisonsand the negotiative and competitive conduct of firms
in the market, viewed in terms of public welfare, provide dimensions of
“market performance”. Just as the performanceof an entire economy or
economic system is judged in terms of the standard of living it provides,
its efficiency or production, pattern of income distribution, progressiveness
and stability is judged and measured in terms of similar criteria.
Moving from market structure and conduct to market performance involves
the insertion of social value judgments into the analysis of agricultural
marketing.
Beginning texts and courses in agricultural marketing frequently set
out to solve “the marketing problem” or a set of problems in the distribu-
tion of farm products. Such treatments implicitly analyze marketing activity
in terms of such “desirable” state of affairs. The most common performance
dimension used is “efficiency.?
Marketing efficiency, like other performance dimensions, is difficult
to tract to individual valuations. Certainly it suggests that resources
should be allocated in such a way that maximum satisfactions will be gained — .
by a group of consumers without making the group of resource owners and
users worse off. The tracing of this optimality criteria to ethical
teachings, however, involves considerable speculation. Perhaps some of-1o-
the iterations of the Biblical ten commandments apply; perhaps some elements
of the democratic political creed are pertinent.
Such speculations need not concernus here. It is enough for the pur-
pose of this paper to suggest that the performance dimension of agricultural
marketing are derived from more fundamental value judgments.
Goals
Goals are the expressed objectives of action programs. They differ
from performance dimensions only in the sense that in aciditiontojudging
and measuring the conduct of firms engaged in agricultural processing and
distribution by some desirable standard, they are set forth in terms of
some proposal designed to “bridge the gap” between what is and what ought
to be.
Using marketing efficiency as an example, a marketing system may be
measured and judged as “inefficient” in the context of market performance.
This performance dimension becomes a qoal when action proposals are made
with their objective being the reduction of marketing inefficiency.
In economic policy discussions generally “goals” are treated as
variablesthat are influenced by “instrument” or “policy” variables. For
example, the goal of full employment may be reached by using the instru-
mentalities of government spending (fiscal policy) or changing of the
money supply (monetary policy).
The goalvariables in agricultural marketing policy are obtained from
the performance dimensions of the market. The instrument variables are
market structure elements and market conduct. This is to say that market
performance is influenced by government through the prohibition, regulation,-11-
or advocati.on of certain market structures and/or conduct. Government may
encourage the standardization of a product (structural element) or may pro-
hibit certain trade practices (market conduct) so as to gain a “socially
desirable” market performance.
What is considered “socially desirable” performance in marketing, and
economics gnerally, was given birth during the Enlightenment Period by
Adam Smith.
The Value Settinq
The Wealth of .— . Nations was both an ethical attack on the government
regulation of business activity and a logical construot of an economic
system of “free enterprise.” This analysis of a self-operating economy
rested upon a number of restrictive market conditions, but revealed the
workings of the “invisible hand of the marketplace” that matched the desires
of consumers to a group of selfish, profit seeking entrepreneurs in such
a way that only “normal profits” prevail while a high quality product
is madeavailable at the lowest possible cost.
Such an explanation netted Smith not only the admiration of fellow
economists, but the wholehearted support of the people of his time. That
the economy would operate not only as well as if government directed its .—
workings, but would even be _ efficient while people individually sought
their own selfish ends, was an analysis consistent with the philosophical
developments during this period of Enlightenment.
Brewster has derived from this philosophical movement a set of value
judgments that are both basic to and consistent with the analysis by Adam
Smith. The political and religious order of the day has sliiftedtheconcept-12-
of God’s work from religious to secular occupations which~ in turn? clashed
with the politically dominated economy of early feudalism. It became the
thought that, politically, each serf was his own lord, and that all men
are equal worth and dignity~ with no one allowed arbitrary power over
another.
Under such a political philosophy each man should have his castle in
the form of a plot of land. By natural restraints farm firms would be held
small in size by the limitations imposed by family labor and management.
The rewards reaped from such productive effort would be equivalent to his
contributions,yet he would have equal opportunity with his neighbor. With
the farm so tied to the owner-worker-manager,any interference by an
“outside” power would rob proprietors of their natural freedom.
The analysis of what came to be called a “perfectly competitive”
economy by Smith fitted in and gave strength to these valuations by showing
that the laizzes-faire economic system described not only allowed the
individualism advocated by political and religious change, but that the
economy would be better off with such valuations as a guiding force than
with government regulation.
Coupling these developments with the opportunities found in America
Brewster says,
“This enabled classical economic theory here to become a far
more formidable system of judgments than the Old World ever shared
concerning what ought and ought not be done for the good of all.
Here as nowhere else, anyone who advocateddeparturefrom the sound
economic doctrine could be annihilated with the retort that he was
putting a ceiling on the American Dream.”
Thus,the analysis of a perfectly campet.itive ec.on~myagress with?
and expounds through its assumptions, the value setting of the free
enterprise, democratic nature of the American people. That perfect-13-
competition be advocated as a method of describing and analyzing
economic activity is np more surprising than it being advoated as a
behavioral “norm” for economic activity. Applied to agricultural
marketing this norm is
The Perfect Market Concept
The idealized economic
the “perfect market concept.”




refine and modify the analysis in such a way that a
economic logic developed. Much of this study was
exactly what kind of conditions needed to prevail so
that the automatic nature of “invisible hand” would work toward the attain-
ment of that economic performance consistent with the philosophy of indi-
vidualism.
Study and reflection revealed that the “invisible hand” of the market
could replace the iron hand of government if perfect competition prevailed.
Perfect competition is a market situation in which a number of “conditions”
exist. If these conditions are net, it then becomes possible to predict
the output and price decisions of the firms in the market. It is also
possible to predict the market performance that such a market would generate.
The “conditions” that must exist for perfect competition are numerous.
The following list provides a summary of some of these “conditions,” which,
of course, also serve as assumptions to any analysis of such a market situation:
1. The size of the
output to guarantee
the behavior of the
firm’s output is sufficiently small relative to industry
that each firm’s output actions cannot perceptively affect
market price prevailing for the industry. (This is referred
to as the “atomistic assumption” and essentially eliminates from analysis the
existence of power relationships between firms either horizontally or
vertically.)-14”
2. The commodity output of the firm is homogeneous with respect to the output
of firms on the same horizontal level in the marketing spectrum. (Although this
element of homogeneity is frequently discussed in terms of the physical char-
acteristics of the product, Chamberlainand Triffin specified the definition
of homogeneity of product in terms of ultimate consumer demand, not its
physical attributes.)
3. The market transactions are spatially oriented to a single point geo-
graphically, a market place. (This assumption disallowed any locational
advantage or disadvantages in the market. By assuming equal transport rates
this assumption can be replaced by a more realistic spatial market, but
only by such a new assumption.)
4. The firm is unable to establish any artificial restrictions in buying
inputs or selling its output. (Discriminatorypricing and the possibility
of holding monopoly rights [such as patents~ is ruled out by this assump-
tion. This condition further excludes the possibility of any form of
market power by the firm.)
5. The complete freedom of entry and exit into and from the industry is
allowed, which ultimately serves as a necessary long-run equilibrium con-
dition for industry price and output solutions. (This condition of entry
is normally discussed in terms of an economic barrier, where little capital
is needed to produce the product, but entry restrictions provided by laws
and pure market power also are eliminated by this assumption.)-15-
6. Perfect or equal knowledge by all firms regarding present and”future prices
in both the input and output markets provide a further limitation to the pos-
sibility of price discrimination or power relationships? but also escapes the
possibility of uncertainty entering the “best available technologies.” (This
assures an optimum allocation of resources, and long-run efficiency by both
the firm and industry.)
It becomes apparent that some of these “conditions” could be influenced
by government through legislation. If a large number’of firms is desired in
an industry, government could prohibit single firms from producing entire
industry output, making the firm “split” and sell part of its plants to
other firms. Or, government could encouraqe the development of new firms
by providing credit, lessening the tax burden upon them, or by briefly
creating a competing operation of its own and later selling this to a new
firm. Similarly, government could take measures with respect to the other
“conditions.”
If the “conditions” of the perfect competition are believed to lead to
market performance that is considered socially desirable, governmental policy
can be aimed at trying to establish these conditions in economic reality.
Adam Smith and others have successfully argued that such market
performance is desirable and that it conforms to an accepted national,
religious, and political philosophy basic to the American Dream. That the
perfectlycompetitive model serves as a grand accumulation of “goals” as a
normative standard for business behavior, should not be surprising. The
legislation, aimed at prohibiting monopolies and “maintaining competition,”
is the resulting evidence of this ethical norm for American business.-16-
The Concept of Countervailing Power
The realities of the economic world of American business soon demon-
strated that while it may be socially desirable~ perfectcompetition was not a
sustaining market structure over time. The development of large firms that
dominated vast industrial sectors, reaping great profits and restricting their
would-be competitors> forced government to “counter-vail” this power by
legislation.
The Sherman Act and subsequent amendments were aimed at dissipating
the economic power of such giant corporations by “prohibition” conspiracies
in the restraint of trade or unfair practices generally. Additional
legislation also was enacted in an attempt to recreate the conditions of a
perfectly competitive economy to “maintain” competition.
This legislation did one other thing. In addition to letting government
“countervails” the corporate giants by prohibiting certain market conduct,
one amendment excused certain business groups from anti-trust enforcement
and subsequently encouraged these groups to form and merge in such a way that
these firms could themselves “countervails” the power of vertically-related
industries. These were the labor union and agricultural cooperative exemptions
from anti-trust legislation in the Clayton Act of 1914.
In addition to allowing certain firms to form and merge so as to
countervails other industry, it was implicitly recognized that uncontrolled
competition would not necessarily result in desirable performance. The most
particular case in point is that of agriculture. Due to the nature of the
demand for farm products and the nature of the farming industry, this
nearest-equivalentto perfect competition on the American scence demonstrated
low labor and enterprise earnings relative to other industries. So low-17-
were these earnings that it became necessary to protect these competitors
by restricting their competition. In addition to encouraging the cooperation
of farmers to jointly market their outputs and purchase their inputs, governmental
policy also encouraged the “fixing” of market prices by formal agreement.
These policies to restrain competition among farmers can be traced to
either of two goals. First, and most consistently used in agricultural
policy discussion, the peculiarities of the agricultural enterprise sector
(the demand they face, the technologically driven “treadmill” increase in
average cost, etc.) require that government aid this industry in many ways
because it is a victim of its own market
includes the marketing of their product.
farmer should receive a “fair” price for
structure. The form that aid takes
Certainly, it is argued, the
his product and anti anti-trust
measures should be used to attain
Another approach and another
inessess that surroundagriculture
this parity price and income.
goal is to argue that because the bus-
are structured such that they inherently
possess greater bargaining power than the farmer does. It is only logical
that the farmer, given the privilege of combining or using pricing practices,
will effectively restrain or countervails the nonfarm agribusinesses.
Regardless of whether the parity income or “parity power” argument is
used, it is a fact that protective or countervailing policies have arisen
that are of extreme importance in agricultural marketing.
The Conflict of Goals
It becomes clear that the goal of attaining a perfectly competitive
situation seriously conflicts with a goal of countervailing the power of
imperfectly competitive firms by encouraging monopoly and monopoly practices.-18-
Such goals would not conflict if they were considered in a short-term
sense. If farmers were given temporary marketing powers while those they
negotiate with were forced toward a perfectly competitive market structure$
the policies would not conflict but would serve as a two-pronged attack against
monopolization. But this has not been the case. Both goals have served as
the base for continued long-term policy programs.
Part 111. AGRICULTURAL MARKETING POLICIES
The conditions necessary for perfectcompetition also.spec?fy-certain
market structure elements that serve as instrument variables in policy
formation. Given that certain performance norms are desirable to society
in general and that such performance automatically results under perfectly
competitive conditions~ it follows that market conditions should be made as
“perfect” as possible. d
A. Perfect Market Policies
The market structure elements that serve as instrument variables in
perfect market policies can be derived from the conditions necessary for
perfect competition. Each of these “elements” significantly influence the
supply or demand relationships present should they change> and such changes?
in turn, influence market conduct and performance. Certain conduct condi-
tions are also listed for perfect competi.tions aridw here these can.be regu-
lated directly they also become part of those policies aimed at creating a
perfect market.
~ For a critical appraisal of this syllogism see Hesse W. Markham,
“Changing Structure of the American Economy: Its Implications for Perfor-
mance of Industrial Markets,” JKE 41 (2): 389-400, May 1959.-19-
The following brief review of existing perfect market policies is cast
in terms of those perfectly competitive market.conditions previously listed.
1. Atomisticity of Power
“The size of the firms output is sufficiently small relative to industry
output in order to guarantee that each firm’s actions cannot perceptively
affect price.”
This condition implies that both the number of firms and the size of
their individual market share are important structural elements. To
influence industries so that the number of firms will be large and each
will possess a small market share is to make the industry more perfectly
competitive.
The number of firms and their market share serve in market structure
analysis as basic data in the computation of “concentration ratios.” The
percent of total industry sales by the largest eight, six, or four firms
in the industry is computed and serves as a comparative device for business




One method to achieve many firms of small size is to simply prohibit
existence of monopolies or near-monopolies in any industry. This was
first major step in marketing policy by the federal government through
enactment of
The wording
that the size of
the Sherman Act.
of this anti-trust act of 1890 did not specifically state
firms was the determinant of whether monopoly existed,
~ For an excellent discussion of concentration ratios, their construction,
and use in analysis see Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization (Wiley and sons~
New York, 1959), especially Chapter 4.-20-
but the courts interpreted the Sherman Act in this way until 1944. ti c..-
demning evidence in support of previous prosecutions was concentration ratio?
showinq that this or that firm was too large in terms of total industry sales.
How big is “too big” is an arbitrary question unless it can be tied to
market conduct and performance. While it is presumed true that large firms
possess great market power, it does not necessarily follow that such power
will be used to restrain trade. This conclusion of the Hartford case of 1944
demonstrated vividly that to merely manipulate market size alone is not
enough to insure a certain market conduct or performance. To suggest that
market power exists by measurements of number and market share is one thing;
to suggest that the possession of market power is bad because it leads to
poor market performance is quite another thing. Y
Even to prohibit monopoly-size, however, is to insure atomisti.city.
Such action only paces an “upper limit” on size of firms. The famous
ALCOA case and subsequent government actions demonstrates another method
that can be used to attain atomisticity. W Although “cease and desist”
~ An interesting review of court interpretations of anti-trust legis-
lation over time is presented in Dykstra, Cases on Government and B~siness
(Callaghan and Company, Chicago, 1948). The 1944 case that finally reversed
the decision that size alone does not constitute restraint of trade was
United States vs. Hartford EmRire Company, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). (This was
also discussed in United States vs. United States Steel Corporation 251 U.S.
417 (1920) but was still unsettled ther~.)
~ This very argument is the unfortunate crux of a recent journal article
that deserves reading merely to see the unjustified assertions that can
lead from other wise sound analysis: Robert F. Langfillotti, “The Superior
MarketPowerof Food Processing and Agricultural Supply Firms - Its Relation
to the Farm Problem,” ~, 42 (5): 1228-1247, December, 1960.
~ United States vs. Aluminum Com~any of America 148 F. 2nrj416 (1945).-21-
orders resulted from findings of monopolization in aluminum by a single firm,
the efforts of World War II required the development of competing aluminum
operations by the Federal government. Following the war, these operations
were sold to firms that would compete with ALCOA. Although it can be
effectively argued that such actions were not anti-trust actions~ this
example does demonstrate another way in which government can dissipate the
size of large firms.
Still other methods are availableunder the taxing and aid programs
of government. Large concentrated business can be taxed heavily, thus
creating competitive disadvantages, or small business development can be
encouraged by provision of credit. But these methods have either been used
in a limited way or are normally justified on other grounds.
The feature policy program directed at the atomisticity condition has
been anti-trust legislation. As noted, it serves only as a restraint to
very large size and does not create the condition of many firms of small
size in a perfectly competitive industry.
2, Homogeneity of Product
“The commodity output of the firm is homogeneous with respect to the
output of firms on the same horizontal level in the marketing spectrum...
the homogeneity is in terms of ultimate consumer demand.”
Real or fancied differentiation of the product by firms (a market
practice) also serves as an instrument variable in agricultural marketing
policy. To make products less differentiated or more homogeneous in the
minds of consumers is the general aim of legislation concerning grades and
standards and to some lesser extent, sanitation requirements.-22-
Most of the federal “grades” for farm products have resulted from a
series of separate pieces of legislation concerning specific commodities. u
Many farm products are not graded and others are being considered as additions to
the list. The goals or purposes of grading are normally given in terms of
production and marketing efficiency and intelligent consumer decision-making.
These goals are performance dimensions of the perfect market and serve separ-
ately to justify grading regulations.
To interpret grading as a marketing policy requires recognition of
an explicit and perhaps over-riding goal in such policy programs -to
encourage a ~ quality product. This implies that a high quality product
would not be forthcoming otherwise under existing market conditions and
that such a policy action is needed to assure quality.
Theperf.ect market by its assumptions assures a homogeneous product
and by its structure assures a high cpalityoutput. “Quality”




“Standards” can be interpreted in two ways. First, an accepted grading
system can become a “standard” for quality. This is a frequent interpre-
tation of the term when used jointly as “grades and standards.” Second,
~ For a survey of the Acts from which these grades arose see Compilation
of Statutes Relatinq to Marketinq Activities...of the A.M.S., U.S.D.A.,
(AgriculturalHandbook Number 130, U.S.D.A., January 1958) and for a
detailed breakdown of the current grading standards used see Grade Names
Used in U.S. Standards for Farm Products (AgriculturalHandbook Number 157.
U.S.DoA., February 1960.)
~ To differentiate by quality attributes is only to differentiate; but
as grades and prices become related the effect is to homogenize.-23-
standards are accepted measurement units (bushels> hundred weights, etc.)
and even extend to retail packaging.
In this second context product differentiation is disallowed by variation
in the measurements of the product. The “economy-sized”package is frequently
d a misnomer of its actual content. By requiring standardized measurements
or packages the market is being made more perfect in terms of the homogeneity
condition.
Homogeneous products are also a side-effect of governmentally imposed
sanitation and purity requirements. A lower quality-limit on product
variation is set by demanding purity within narrow tolerance limits. Seed
certification programs, for example, help homogenize products by purity
standards for producers using seed. Meat inspection programs provide a
sanitary, disease-free product to consumers but also place a limit on
product variation in livestock products.
These product standardizationpolicies do not complete’ly disallow
product heterogeneity. Real product variation in quality continues to occur
despite longrun tendencies toward more standardized products. It can be
argued that such variation is “good” on the grounds that by the existence
of greater product variety more consumers are satisfied. Fancified product
variation, the promulgation of ignorance rather than knowledge is lessened
by those policies if they are made effective through enforcement and education.
3. Locational Equalization
“Market transactions are spatially oriented to a single point geographically,
a market place.”
8J The September 1960 issue of Consumer Report investigatessome decep-
tive packaging practicesworthyof reading. Current Congressional hearing
are also being held in this field.-24-
Locational disadvantage to farmers has three important legislative aspects.
The first of these relates to the InterstateCommerce Act of 1887. All inter-
state commerce became subject to federal regulation under this bill and was
upheld in later Supreme Court decisions. 2/ While this legislation applied to
all business? there was a single exception –the shipment of agricultural
products.
The agricultural exemption in interstate trucking of farm commodities
and “unmanufactured items thereof” has received considerable written treat-
ment and serves as testimony of agricultural favoritism in current economic
policy. This exemption now means that the ICC has no control over who enters
the business of trucking these commodities, the routes he travels, the areas
he serves, and the rates he charges.
The apparent original intention of the exemption was to aid the farmer
by withholding restraints on the shipments of products to the first point
of transfer. Since farmers normally handled this transportation, the law
was aimed at providing special aid to a geographically dispersed and dis-
advantaged farm community. The scope of this original legislation extended,
however, to all non-manufactured farm products and created special advantage
to the transportation until enactment of the Transportation Act of 1958J
which limited the “exempt” commodities somewhat. Y
~ The earlier case of Gibbons vs. Oqden, 9 Wheat, 1(1824), set the stage
for this act and the commerce powers were greatly (and peculiarly) extended in
the 1937 case, National Labor Relations Board VS, Jones and Lauqhlin Steel
Corporation, 301 U.S. 1. This latter case allowed government regulation of
those businesses dealing only inter-state by the precarious lo9ic that H
such a business did not exist in the state its product would have to be
shipped in3 thus it is under federal control.
~ For a discussion of the Agricultural exemption in interstate trucking,
see Marketing Research Reports Number 188:!(A Legislative and Judicial
History), U.S.D.A., July 1957 and Number 352, (Developments in 1957-58),
U.S.D.A., July 1959.-25-
The exemption provision of the Interstate Commerce Act served as a means
of attaining more perfect location
those businesses that assumed this
Another locational policy has
competition for the farmer and later for
task from him.
already been briefly summarized in the
Sherman and Interstate Commerce Acts by their subsequent regulation of ,rai.1
transportation. The charge of rate profiteering at the expense of farmers
who had no other way to reach their markets was an important influence in
the adoption of these laws. To regulate raii rates was to again lessen his
locational disadvantage.
A further method to lessen or strengthen locdt.ional misfortunes of
businesses are agro~pof state laws that serve as barriers to
states. An early compilation of these laws shows a forbiding
state legislation that is still largely current law. ~ The
tion or taxing of imports across state lines may either serve
or discourage a perfect markety but m:~nyof these laws in the







“The firm is unable to establish any artificial restrictions in their
trade in the input and output markets.”
The battie against discrimination and restraint of trade is~ of course~
the essential feature of the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890. Later courts
interpreted this act to mean that monopolization not monopoly was a violat-
ion of the law~ the difference being that monopoly indicated only size
N Comparative Charts of State Statutes Illustrating Barriers to
Trade Between States~ Marketing Laws Survey, W.P.A.g May 1939.-26-
while monopolization indicated monopoly practices. The Sherman Act simply
declared such actions illegal.
The Clayton Act (1914) and Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) went
further than the Sherman Law by specifying how firms should and should not
compete. These pieces of legislation~ frequently termed “amendments” to
the original anti-trust act were aimed directly at controlling market
conduct.
Several legislative enactments following these, also directed toward
controlling market practices directly, included the Robinson-Patman Act
of 1936 (establishedrules against price discrimination),the Miller-
Tyding Act of 1937 (made state “fair trade” laws legal in interstate commerce)
and, after a Supreme Court ruling that the Miller-Tydings law was illegal,
resale price maintenance was restored in the McQuire Act of 1952. d
The direct control of market practices was also enacted by agricultural
commodity groups. These laws, familiar to agriculturalists,include the
Commodity Exchange Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, United States Warehouse
Act, Product Agency Act~ and Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act. M
While some portions of these bills deal with grades and standards, much
of their content is aimed at directly regulating the conduct of firms in the
marketplace for these products. The general form of this regulation is
M A review of this legislation is given in Marshall Dismack, Business
and Government (Henry Holt, New York, 1953), Chapter 8, “T~e Regulation O’f
—.-.—
Trade Practices,”
M Reference to these laws are compiled in Abridqed List of Federal Laws
Applicable to Agriculture, (Office of Information, Mimeograph Number 2, 1950)-27-
directed toward the prohibition of monopolistic practices and the encourage-
ment of more competitive conditions in the market.
5. Free Entry and Exit
“The complete freedom of entry and exit is allowed to and from the
industry -without legal or economic restrictions.”
The economic aspects of entry conditions in the market are regulated
by government via anti-trust legislation and is influenced by the provision
credit and education to firms and laborers. For agriculture, these latter
policy programs are evidenced by the vast financial system set up by law to aid
agriculture and by educational and extension programs to “help the young
people get started in farming.”
The leqal aspects of entry deserve brief comment. The patent laws
providing monopoly rights to inventors and public utility franchises, and
allowing monopoly under the strict control of government, provide interesting
examples of non-perfect conditions promulgated by the federal government.
These examples demonstrate some of the conflict in agriculturalmarketing
goals to be later pursued in more detail.
Generally speaking, however, unrestricted entry and exit is the primary
target to federal policy aimed at the regulation of marketing activity. W
6. Perfect Knowledqe and Certainty
“Perfect or equal knowledge of firms regarding prices in their input
or output markets is disallowed ... and uncertainty is eliminated.”
Lack of adequate information by farmers concerning market prices led
to the formation of government agencies that collect information on prices
~ Enactments and administrativerulings concerning the entry condition
are discussed in Joe S. Bain, ~. cit., pp. 237-264.-28-
and quantities of farm products sold and disseminate these data to farmers
(market news) and use it to predict future prices (market outlook). These
marketing services by government tend to dispell lack of knowledge and
uncertainty in marketing farm products and tend to make such marketing
W more perfect.
Several programs already discussed can also be related to this condition.
Grading, standards, and sanitation requirements, if made effective by edu-
cational programs3 also serve to lower ignorance levels. The research and
extension services of the federal government also provide examples of
programs that lessen the lack of knowledge and uncertainty in the market.
Uncertainty, of course, is reduced by credit provisions involving in-
surance and price supports.
This brief overview of agriculturalmarketing policies suggests their
dependency on the concept of the perfect market. It also suggests that
despite the magnitude of the complex of regulatory activity, a perfect
market is really unattainable by policy action under out political philosophy.
Most of this policy either prohibits extreme variation from the conditions
of perfectcompetition orencouraqes perfectly competitive behavior,
In the words of Sosnick,
“The set of market structure and conduct attributes which define
‘perfect competition’ constitute individually and collectively
neither a normative ideal nor a satisfactory basis for appraising
M A comprehensive historical survey of market news and outlook services
provided by the federal government is contained in Taylor and Taylor,
The Story of Agricultural Economics in the United States (Iowa State College
Press, Ames, 1952), Chapters 12, 13, and 17.
l“-29-
actual market conditions ... the extremes
and otherwise perfect competition tell us
which define atomistic
nothing about desirable ../
gradations in even the few dimensions to which they refer ...” g
While perfect competition is unattainable, it is necessary that some
consideration be given to what is a “workable” goal toward which policy can
be directed.
It is under the guide of “workable competition” that it is possible to
justify countervailing power policies in agricultural marketing.
B. Countervailing Power Policies
When businesses combine, merge, and grow in size in one industry while
those in a vertically-relatedindustry do not, the balance of bargaining
power in the market becomes one-sided. This has been the historical ex-
perience in agriculturalmarketing and farming.
This lack of bargaining power on the part of the farmer was recognized
in anti-trust legislation by exempting the agricultural industry from pros-
ecutions under the Clayton Act. The exemption of excused marketing and
supply cooperatives and cooperative mergers from anti-trust action gave
w countervailing power privileges to the farmer.
The Copper-Volstead Act, of course, followed the Clayton Act exemption
giving special encouragement to the formation of agricultural cooperatives
and specified the criteria for cooperative organization to exempt if from
paying business income taxes. Succeeding legislation and the formation of
~ Stephen A. Sosnick, “A Critic of Concepts of Workable Competition,”
C@, August 1958, pp. 383-384.
~ A discussion of “types” of bargaining poweravai.lab’le to farmers is
found in Robert Clodius, “Opportunities and Limitations In Improving the
Bargaining Power of Farmers,” Agricultural Adjustment Center Release,
Iowa State College, Ames, October 1958.-30-
special agencies in the government prompted and encouraged the growth of
agricultural cooperatives to a size and extent that
their marketing competitors.
But to countervails power in the marketplace by
today excells most of
encouraging changes in
size and concentration was deemed insufficient. The Agricultural Marketing
Act of 1937 allowed farmers and their negotiating parties to “fix” prices
and restrict entry by formal agreement. A host of marketing orders and
agreements have arisen for various farm products that aim to protect the
farmer from the disadvantages that perfect competition impose upon him.
While general anti-trust policy prohibited collusion on pricing and
restraint of trade, the Agricultural Marketing Act allowed and encouraged
such marketing conduct.
While the policies related to attaininga perfect market forbid the
uncontrolled growth of businesses, the cooperative exemption allowed and
encouraged such growth for one sector of the economy.
This rather astounding conflict in policy programs has been treated
passively as a simple “exception” that does not seriously affect the
operational performance of American Business in general. Counter to this
feeling Bain says,
“In consequence of the scope and character of the treatment of
the ‘exceptional’cases, it is not longer possible to regard
the various anti-competitivepolicies as merely an assortment
of unusual and special departures from the general procompetitive
policy. Rather all must recognize that these exceptional policies
as a group embody a second orientation or line of emphasis in
American public policy toward business, which an important part
is potentially in cooflict with and inconsista~t with the qeneral
procompetitive policy.” J&/
-1& Joe S. Bain, ~. =.$ p. 541, the underscoring is mine.